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Abstract. Pursuit-evasion scenarios appear widely in robotics, security
domains, and many other real-world situations. We focus on two-player
pursuit-evasion games with concurrent moves, infinite horizon, and dis-
counted rewards. We assume that the players have a partial observability,
however, the evader is given an advantage of knowing the current posi-
tion of the units of the pursuer. This setting is particularly interesting
for security domains where a robust strategy, designed to maximize the
utility in the worst-case scenario, is often desirable. We provide, to the
best of our knowledge, the first algorithm that provably converges to the
value of a partially observable pursuit-evasion game with infinite horizon.
Our algorithm extends well-known value iteration algorithm by exploit-
ing that (1) the value functions of our game depend only on position
of the pursuer and the belief he has about the current position of the
evader, and (2) that these functions are piecewise linear and convex in
the belief space.
1 Introduction
Pursuit-evasion games appear in many scenarios in robotics and security do-
mains [13,2], where a team of centrally controlled pursuing units (the pursuer)
aims to locate and capture the evader, while the evader aims for the opposite.
We study this class of games and assume their discrete-time variant played on
a finite graph. We further assume that all units of both players move simul-
taneously, that the horizon of the game is infinite, the rewards are discounted
over time with discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1), and that the players have only a par-
tial information about the state of the world. Formally, such a game belongs to
zero-sum partially observable stochastic games (POSGs).
We are interested in finding robust strategies of the pursuer against the worst-
case evader. Specifically, we assume that the evader knows the positions of the
pursuing units and her only uncertainty is the strategy of the pursuer and the
move that will be performed in the current time step. Although in reality such
perfectly informed adversary is rarely met, it is typical that the pursuer does not
know what information is being revealed to the evader. Hence, in order to derive
robust strategies (i.e. those that maximize pursuer’s reward against any type of
the evader), it is natural to consider this kind of perfectly informed adversary.
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We design the first algorithm that provably converges to the value of such
one-sided partially observable pursuit-evasion games. Moreover as the value con-
verges, the strategies of the players converge to their optimal strategies as well.
This is in contrast to the existing approaches in robotics and security, where
heuristic solutions without any optimality guarantees are used [13,2].
Our algorithm extends the well-known value iteration algorithm that is known
to work for concurrent-moves stochastic games [9] as well as for partially ob-
servable models from decision theory – Partially Observable Markov Decision
Processes (POMDPs) [10,7,8,11]. We adopt the methodology for POMDPs and
show that one-sided pursuit-evasion games also allow us to define compactly
represented value functions and thus to design a dynamic programming algo-
rithm that iteratively improves values of game states over time and converges to
the value of the game. Specifically we show that the value functions (1) depend
only on the position of the units of the pursuer and the belief he has about the
possible position of the evader, but do not depend on the history of moves, (2)
these functions are piecewise linear and convex and thus can be, similarly to
POMDPs, represented as a set of so called α-vectors (Section 2.1), and (3) we
can design a dynamic-programming operator that provably converges to optimal
value of the game when applied on these value functions (Section 3).
We believe that our algorithm (accompanied with related theoretical results)
is of comparable significance in this class of games as the full-backed value iter-
ation algorithm in the class of POMDPs and it is a necessary first step towards
designing practical scalable algorithms.
Due to the space constraints, most of the technical proofs can be found in
the Appendix.
1.1 Related Work
A similar model with one-sided partial observability where one of the players
has a perfect information was presented by McEneaney [6]. The author assumed
that the player with perfect information knows the action the opponent plays
at the current stage. Due to the turn-based character of such game, the author
considers only pure strategies.
The difference between our concurrent setup and the turn-based one is high-
lighted in Fig. 1. In the turn-based setting, the evader always observes the action
played by the pursuer before making her action. This allows the evader to always
move to a vertex that is unoccupied by the pursuer, hence preventing the pur-
suer from ever capturing him. On the other hand, in the concurrent setting, the
only thing the evader can get to know is that the pursuer chooses every vertex
with equal probability. She cannot anticipate the move of the pursuer and hence
gets captured with probability 1/3 in the first round of the game.
Our setting with concurrent moves better corresponds to the real-world situ-
ations that occur in real time. As the evader does not know the action taken by
the pursuer in the current stage, players may need to use randomized strategies.
However, allowing randomized strategies provides challenges in the design of the
dynamic programming operator that we address in this paper.
P E
Fig. 1. A game with one unit of the pursuer (node marked with P) and the evader
(node marked with E). Pure strategies are insufficient if players act simultaneously.
Another model that uses one-sided partial observability was considered by
Chatterjee et al. [1], however with reachability and safety objectives (a player
either wants to reach a set of target states or she wants to keep the system in a
set of safe states) that do not translate to objectives with discounted rewards.
An algorithm for solving a broader class of POSGs, where all players have
imperfect information, was proposed in [4], yet considering the finite horizon
only. The information is not shared among players, hence they typically attain
different beliefs about the state of the game. The algorithm uses ideas of dynamic
programming to incrementally construct a set of pure strategies, longer ones
from the shorter ones. The set of such strategies is then used to form a normal-
form representation of the POSG. The use of iterated elimination of dominated
strategies ensures that irrelevant strategies are not considered. Nevertheless,
in some games all strategies are relevant and this elimination does not help.
This is the case of the game in Fig. 1 where the uniform play of the pursuer
involves randomization over all pure strategies considered by the algorithm; the
number of such strategies being exponential in the horizon. The one-sided partial
observability in our game allows us to avoid such enumeration of pure strategies,
define dynamic programming over values of the subgames, and, in this particular
case, represent the optimal infinite horizon strategy using a single α-vector.
2 Finite-horizon game
We use the notion of finite-horizon POSGs, or extensive-form games, to rea-
son about the infinite-horizon pursuit-evasion game with discounted rewards.
An extensive-form game (EFG) is a tuple G = (N ,H,Z, T , u, I). N is the set
of players, in our case N = {p, e} where p stands for the pursuer and e for
the evader. Set H denotes a finite set of histories of actions taken by all play-
ers from the begining of the game. Every history corresponds to a node in the
game tree; hence we use the terms history and node interchangeably. Each of
the histories may be either (1) terminal (h ∈ Z ⊆ H) where the game ends and
player i gets utility ui(h), (2) controlled by the nature player who selects the
successor node according to a fixed probability distribution known to all play-
ers, or (3) one of the players from N may be to act. We consider a zero-sum
scenario where up(h) = −ue(h). To simplify the notation we use u(h) to denote
pursuer’s reward. An ordered list of transitions of player i from root to node h
is referred to as a player i’s sequence. The allowed transitions in the game are
modelled using a transition function T that provides a set of successor nodes for
each non-terminal history. The imperfect observation of players is modelled via
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Fig. 2. An EFG representation of a finite-horizon pursuit-evasion game.
information sets Ii that form a partition over histories h where player i ∈ N
takes action. We assume perfect recall setting where the players never forget
their past actions, i.e. for every Ii ∈ Ii, all histories h ∈ Ii have the same player
i’s sequence. Each information set Ii ∈ Ii corresponds to one decision point of
player i. A randomized behavioral strategy of player i assigns a distribution over
actions to each of the information sets in Ii. A behavioral strategy of player i
can be represented in the form of a realization plan r which assigns probability of
playing sequence σi to each player i’s sequence σi. The behavioral strategy at in-
formation set Ii ∈ Ii reached using a sequence σi is then b(Ii, a) = r(σia)/r(σi).
A Nash equilibrium (NE) in an EFG is a pair of behavioral strategies, in which
each player plays a best response to the strategy of the opponent. The expected
utility of the pursuer when NE strategies are played by both players is referred
to as the value of the game.
We will now use this terminology to construct an EFG for a finite-horizon
version of a pursuit-evasion game with N pursuing units played on a graph
G = 〈V, E〉 for t rounds (we term t as the horizon). Part of the game tree is
shown in Fig. 2. At every round τ ≤ t, pursuer’s units occupy vertices sτp , where
sτp =
{
sτp,1, . . . , s
τ
p,N
}
is an N -element multiset of vertices of G, and the evader is
located in vertex sτe ∈ V. The goal of the pursuer is to achieve a situation where
the evader is caught, i.e. sτe ∈ sτp . In every round, players have to move their units
to vertices adjacent to their current positions (adj(v) denotes the set of vertices
adjacent to v). Position of the evader in round τ + 1 is thus sτ+1e ∈ adj(sτe ). We
overload the operator adj to apply it also on multisets representing positions of
pursuer’s units, i.e. sτ+1p ∈ adj(sτp), where adj(sτp) = ×i=1...Nadj(sτp,i).
A horizon-t game Gt
〈
s0p, b
0
〉
is parametrized by the initial position of the
pursuer s0p ∈ VN and a distribution over evader’s initial positions b0 ∈ ∆(V)
known to both players (we term b0 the initial belief ). The game starts with a
chance move selecting the initial position of the evader s0e (based on b
0).
A history h ∈ H in a game with horizon t corresponds to a list of positions
s0es
1
ps
1
e · · · sτpsτe , where τ ≤ t. The utility values are assigned to terminal histories
as follows: in case the pursuer failed to capture the evader in time, i.e. if τ = t
and sτe 6∈ sτp , the pursuer gets utility u(h) = 0; if he successfully captured the
evader in the time limit t, i.e. if τ ≤ t and sτe ∈ sτp , the pursuer gets the reward
u(h) = γτ for capturing the evader in τ rounds (where γ ∈ [0, 1) stands for
the discount factor). The transition function T complies with the graph (i.e.,
the adjacency function adj), hence sτp ∈ adj(sτ−1p ) and sτe ∈ adj(sτ−1e ) for every
τ ≥ 1. For notational simplicity we denote the sequence of pursuer’s actions
s1p · · · sτp in h as h|p and the sequence of evader’s actions s1e · · · sτe in h as h|e.
The position of the evader is unknown to the pursuer. Hence, in a perfect
recall game, there is one pursuer’s information set Ip[σp] for each of his sequences
σp where Ip[σp] = {h′ | h′∈H\Z : h′|p=σp}.
Evader on the other hand knows the game situation almost perfectly. She
knows where the pursuer’s units were located before the pursuer acted in the
current round of the game (recall that we assume that pursuer acts first). The
only information missing to the evader is the action being taken by the pursuer
in the current round. Hence, for every history h = s0es
1
ps
1
e · · · sτpsτe where the pur-
suer is to play, there is evader’s information set Ie[h] =
{
hsτ+1p |sτ+1p ∈ adj(sτp)
}
containing all possible continuations of the pursuer.
2.1 Shape of the value function
The size of the extensive-form game representation and associated behavioral
strategies grows exponentially as the horizon increases. This makes it quickly
impossible to apply standard algorithms operating on game trees, especially
since we aim to solve infinite horizon games.
We aleviate the problem of increasing complexity of the strategy represen-
tation by representing them only as their values. We show that the value of
a strategy is linear in the belief, and we can thus represent it using just |V| real
numbers. Moreover we show that there is a finite set of behavioral strategies
that needs to be considered in a game with arbitrary finite horizon, regardless
of the initial belief, and thus the value function representing the value of the
best strategy at every belief is piecewise linear and convex, which allows us to
represent this function in a compact manner.
Definition 1. A value function vt
〈
s0p
〉
: ∆(V) → [0, 1] is a function assigning
the value vt
〈
s0p
〉
(b0) of the game Gt
〈
s0p, b
0
〉
to every initial belief b0 about the
position of the evader. By vt we mean a set of value functions vt
〈
s0p
〉
, one for
each initial position s0p ∈ VN of the pursuer.
In the following text we show that a value function vt
〈
s0p
〉
is piecewise lin-
ear and convex (PWLC) in the belief for every finite horizon t. For notational
simplicity, the term linear will be used to refer to an affine function as well. The
proof is structured as follows: (1) first of all we show that the expected utility of
every strategy of the pursuer is linear in the belief, next (2) there is a finite set
of behavioral strategies Σt
〈
s0p
〉
applicable in games Gt
〈
s0p, ·
〉
such that for every
initial belief b0 ∈ ∆(V) the pursuer has about the position of the evader, at least
one strategy in Σt
〈
s0p
〉
is a NE solution of the game Gt
〈
s0p, b
0
〉
; and finally (3)
we show that the PWLC nature of the value function follows from (1) and (2).
Lemma 1. Let σp be a randomized behavioral strategy of the pursuer in games
Gt
〈
s0p, b
0
〉
, where the pursuer starts in vertices s0p, parametrized by the initial
belief about the position of the evader b0. The expected utility of playing σp against
a best responding opponent is linear in b0.
Proof. As the strategy σp of the pursuer is fixed and the actual evader’s position
s0e is revealed to the evader, it is not necessary from her perspective to consider
the initial belief b0 to derive the optimal evasive plan. She therefore chooses
the optimal evasive plan (minimizing expected pursuer’s utility) for every her
possible initial position, value of each such plan being a constant. The initial
belief b0 forms a convex combination of values of individual evasive plans, which
is a linear function in the belief space. uunionsq
Theorem 1. Let Gt
〈
s0p, b
0
〉
be a horizon-t game parametrized by the initial belief
b0 where the pursuer starts in a set of vertices s0p. There exists a finite set of
pursuer’s behavioral strategies Σt
〈
s0p
〉
such that for every initial belief b0 about
the position of the evader, the set Σt
〈
s0p
〉
contains at least one strategy σp ∈
Σt
〈
s0p
〉
that is in Nash equilibrium of Gt
〈
s0p, b
0
〉
.
Proof. We use the sequence-form linear program for solving EFGs [5] to reason
about the set of strategies Σt
〈
s0p
〉
the pursuer has to consider. In this LP, values
in every information set of the evader, as well as the value v(root) in the root node
of the game tree, are computed in a bottom-up fashion. Every such value v(Ie)
of an information set Ie can be seen as a concave piecewise linear function in the
space of pursuer’s realization plans (a compact representation of his behavioral
strategies). The pursuer then seeks for a realization plan that maximizes v(root);
the maximizer of which can be found among extreme points of line segments of
v(root), i.e. vertices of a polytope bounded by this function [12]. We show that
the set of such extreme points does not depend on the initial belief b0.
There is one information set Ie[s
0
e] of the evader for each of her initial po-
sitions s0e. The utility of every terminal node in the subgame beneath Ie[s
0
e]
is multiplied with chance probability b(s0e), which allows us to factor out this
probability and obtain the following constraint for the root node:
v(root) ≤
∑
s0e∈s0p
b0(s0e) +
∑
s0e∈V\s0p
b0(s0e) · vˆ(Ie[s0e]) (1)
Value v(root) is a convex combination of concave piecewise linear functions
vˆ(Ie[s
0
e]). As the belief was factored out, these functions, as well as the finite
set of their extreme points P [s0e], no longer depend on the belief. This convex
combination with arbitrary coefficients b0 cannot have an extreme where none of
the functions vˆ(Ie[s
0
e]) has one. The set of extreme points is therefore a subset of⋃
s0e
P [s0e] — a finite set that does not depend on the belief. Each of the extreme
points in
⋃
s0e
P [s0e] corresponds to one pursuer’s realization plan, and thus one
his behavioral strategy, which allows us to construct the finite set Σt
〈
s0p
〉
. uunionsq
Theorem 2. Value function vt
〈
s0p
〉
is piecewise linear and convex in the belief
space.
Proof. This result directly follows from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. There is a finite
set of randomized strategies Σt
〈
s0p
〉
that has to be considered by the pursuer and
value of each such strategy is linear in the belief space. Thus the value function
vt
〈
s0p
〉
is a pointwise maximum taken over a finite set of linear functions, which
is a PWLC function in the belief space. uunionsq
Every PWLC function can be represented as a finite set of α-vectors. Every
such α-vector α = (α1, . . . , α|V|) represents one of the affine functions by assign-
ing an expected reward αi to each of the pure beliefs. We will often be working
with the α-vector representation of the value function, hence we overload the
notation and consider value functions also as sets of such α-vectors.
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 imply that every linear segment of the PWLC value
function corresponds to one randomized strategy of the pursuer. This is similar
to the POMDP case where each α-vector corresponds to one conditional plan.
This allows us to use terms α-vector and pursuer’s strategy interchangeably.
3 Value iteration
In the previous section, we related the concept of the value functions to the EFG
representation of the game and proved that these functions have desirable prop-
erties (they are piecewise linear and convex). We leverage their representation to
design a dynamic programming approach inspired by value iteration algorithms
for either POMDPs [10,7] or perfect information stochastic games [9].
The algorithm inductively constructs a sequence of value functions {vt}∞t=0,
starting with values of a horizon-0 game (where the utility of the pursuer depends
solely on the fact whether the evader starts in a vertex where one of the pursuer’s
units is located).
We avoid using the exponentially-sized representation of the underlying EFG
by computing value function of a horizon-t game using the solution of the game
with horizon t−1. First of all we show that there is a well-defined value update
formula that expresses values of vt using value functions vt−1 (Theorem 3). We
let the players choose their strategies for the first round of the horizon-t game
using the maximin principle (we term such strategies one-step strategies) and
we show that the pursuer can use these strategies to update his belief. Pursuer’s
one-step strategy pip is a distribution over possible actions of his units, pip ∈
adj(s0p), from which he samples his action. The evader acts similarly, however
she conditions her decision on her true position s0e (not just on the overall belief
available to the pursuer); her one-step strategy is thus a mapping pie :V → ∆(V),
such that pie(s
0
e) assigns zero probability to vertices not adjacent to s
0
e.
The piecewise linearity and convexity of value functions have implications
on the computation of value functions. Firstly it allows us to find optimal one-
step strategies by means of linear programming (Section 3.1), furthermore it
makes it possible to avoid evaluating the value update formula in every point in
the belief space when constructing new value functions. Instead it is possible to
construct new value functions incrementally and focus only on beliefs where the
function being constructed has its extreme points of line segments (Section 3.2).
We conclude by showing that the dynamic programming operator used in the
value iteration algorithm has a unique fixpoint corresponding to value functions
of an infinite horizon game which ensures convergence properties of the algorithm
(Theorem 4).
Theorem 3. The value of the game Gt
〈
s0p, b
〉
can be computed from the solu-
tions of horizon-(t− 1) games, whose values are represented by a set of value
functions vt−1. It holds that
vt
〈
s0p
〉
(b) =
∑
se∈s0p
b(se) + γ
 ∑
se∈V\s0p
b(se)
 ·max
pip
min
pie
∑
s1p∈VN
pip(s
1
p) · vt−1
〈
s1p
〉
(bpie) (2)
where the transformed belief bpie depends solely on the evader’s one-step strategy
pie and the parametrization of the game G
t
〈
s0p, b
〉
:
bpie(s
′
e) =
1∑
se∈V\s0p b(se)
∑
se∈V\s0p
b(se) · pie(se, s′e) (3)
The computation of vt by means of Equation (2) forms a dynamic programming
operator H, such that vt = Hvt−1.
Proof. The correctness of the value update formula will be proven by computing
the value of the game Gt
〈
s0p, b
〉
in a bottom-up fashion. We start by considering
that the one-step strategies of the players for the first round of the game are
fixed, while they play optimally in the rest of the game. This determines pursuer’s
expected reward at every node in the game tree, which allows us to express his
expected utility in the root node of the game tree as an expectation over expected
rewards in subsequent nodes (Lemma 2). Due to the fixed behavior in the first
round of the game, parts of the game tree are independent on each other —
we refer to these subgames as G[s1p]. This allows us to evaluate the expectation
depicted in Lemma 2 by solving these games separately. It turns out that games
G[s1p] are strategically equivalent to a game G
t−1〈s1p, bpie〉 with shorter horizon,
the solution of which is represented by value functions vt−1. The expectation
can thus be expressed solely in terms of vt−1. Finally the assumption of fixed
one-step strategies for the first round of the game gets relaxed, which yields the
desired maximin formula from Equation (2). The derivation of the value update
formula relies on several technical lemmas, the proofs of which can be found in
the Appendix.
Let pip∈∆(adj(s0p)) be a fixed pursuer’s one-step strategy, and pie : V → ∆(V)
be a fixed one-step strategy of the evader. Assume that both players play accord-
ing to pip and pie in the first round of the game, i.e. the pursuer follows pip in his
information set Ip[∅] (i.e. pursuer’s information set where he has not acted yet,
see Fig. 2) and the evader plays according to pie(s
0
e) in her information set Ie[s
0
e]
(where she has received the information that she is located in vertex s0e). Once
the first round of the game is over, players continue with their best strategies
for the situation they are currently in. We denote such optimal strategies where
the players are restricted to play pip and pie in the first round as σp and σe.
Definition 2. Let pip and pie be fixed one-step strategies of the players for the
first round of the game Gt
〈
s0p, b
〉
and let σp, σe be optimal strategies of the players
with the restriction to play pip and pie in the first round. The expected reward of
the pursuer when strategies (σp, σe) are followed and node h in the game tree is
reached is denoted u(h) and termed expected reward in h.
We follow by expressing the expected utility the pursuer gets when strategies
(σp, σe) are followed by propagating expected rewards from subsequent nodes in
the game tree. We use histories of the form s0es
1
ps
1
e where the evader started in
vertex s0e (based on the move of nature) and then, during the first round of the
game, the pursuer moved his units to vertices s1p and the evader moved to s
1
e.
Lemma 2. The expected reward in the root node equals to:
u(∅) =
∑
s0e∈s0p
b(s0e) +
 ∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e)
 ·∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p)
(
γ
∑
s1e∈s1p
bpie(s
1
e)+
+
[ ∑
s1e 6∈s1p
bpie(s
1
e)
] ∑
s1e 6∈s1p
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
[
b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)∑
s˜1e 6∈s1p
∑
s˜0e 6∈s0p
b(s˜0e) · pie(s˜0e, s˜1e) · u(s
0
es
1
ps
1
e)
])
(4)
Lemma 2 expressed the value in the root node based on the expected rewards
in histories s0es
1
ps
1
e where the pursuer is to move. The pursuer knows only s
1
p,
hence these histories are partitioned into his information sets Ip[s
1
p], one for each
move s1p of the pursuer in the first round (see Fig. 2). Importantly, for every
subgame below Ip[s
1
p], there is no information set that would involve nodes not
present in this subgame — neither pursuer nor evader forget that s1p was played.
The optimal behavior in these subgames therefore depends only on the belief in
Ip[s
1
p], which is fixed due to the fixed behavior in the first round. We can therefore
compute value of the subgame below Ip[s
1
p] separately by making chance simulate
the belief in this information set.
Let us construct a game G[s1p] which consists of the information set Ip[s
1
p]
and the subgame beneath it. In this game, information set Ip[s
1
p] is reached with
probability β =
∑
s1e 6∈s1p bpie(s
1
e), while with probability 1 − β the pursuer gets
utility γ without play — this accounts for the reward the pursuer gets if he
catches the evader in the first round by playing action s1p. The nature player
simulates the belief b[s1p] in the information set Ip[s
1
p], so that the probability of
every history in this information set, given this information set was reached, is
identical with the original game. The value of the game G[s1p] corresponds to the
following part of the Equation (4):
γ
∑
s1e∈s1p
bpie(s
1
e)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Evader caught
in the first round
+
 ∑
s1e 6∈s1p
bpie(s
1
e)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Evader not caught
in the first round
∑
s1e 6∈s1p
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
 b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)∑
s˜1e 6∈s1p
∑
s˜0e 6∈s0p
b(s˜0e) · pie(s˜0e, s˜1e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Belief b[s1p] of history s
0
es
1
ps
1
e in Ip[s
1
p]
·u(s0es1ps1e)
 (5)
In the case of the game G[s1p], there are multiple histories for every current
position of the evader s1e in the information set Ip[s
1
p] (resulting from different
initial locations of the evader s0e). We show that it is not necessary to account for
different initial positions of the evader s0e, and thus all histories in Ip[s
1
p] having
the same current position of the evader s1e can be merged. The resulting game
contains a single history for each s1e in Ip[s
1
p], and thus this game is equivalent
to a shorter horizon game Gt−1
〈
s1p, bpie
〉
up to multiplication of the utilities by γ
to account for a round that has already passed. This allows using the solution of
Gt−1
〈
s1p, bpie
〉
represented by value functions vt−1 to express the value of G[s1p].
Definition 3. Two deterministic game trees over nodes H1,H2 are isomorphic
if there exists a bijection ξ : H1 → H2 such that v ∈ H1 is a successor of u ∈ H1
if and only if ξ(v) is a successor of ξ(u), n ∈ H1 is a pursuer’s node if and
only if ξ(n) is a pursuer’s node, it is a terminal node if and only if ξ(n) is a
terminal node and the utilities u(n) = u(ξ(n)). Moreover the trees have the same
informational structure so that two nodes u, v ∈ H1 are in the same information
set if and only if nodes ξ(u), ξ(v) are in the same information set.
We can observe that subtrees of nodes s0es
1
ps
1
e and s
0
es
1
ps
1
e (where s
0
e and s
0
e
stands for two different initial positions of the evader) are isomorphic as we can
establish a bijection ξ(s0es
1
ps
1
ehrest) = s
0
es
1
ps
1
ehrest. The utility of terminal his-
tories does not depend on the initial position of the evader (only on the time
when the pursuer managed to capture the evader). Whenever pursuer’s node u
is in information set Ip, node ξ(u) is in Ip as well (because pursuer has no way
to detect the evader’s initial position). Moreover whenever evader cannot distin-
guish between two histories s0es
1
ps
1
e · · · sqp and s0es1ps1e · · · sqp, she cannot distinguish
between histories s0es
1
ps
1
e · · · sqp and s0es1ps1e · · · sqp either (because her uncertainty
is related to the pursuer’s move at round q, which does not depend on the ini-
tial position of the evader). Thus the subtrees have also the same informational
structure.
Lemma 3. Let I be the topmost information set of game G[s1p] and let the belief
b[I] over nodes from I be known and fixed. Let n1, n2 ∈ I be two nodes whose
subtrees are isomorphic. Then a game G′ with the same structure as G with any
belief b′[I] in I, satisfying b[n1] + b[n2] = b′[n1] + b′[n2] and b[n] = b′[n] for all
nodes other than n1 and n2, has the same value as G.
Thanks to the Lemma 3 and the isomorphism of the subtrees beneath s0es
1
ps
1
e
and s0es
1
ps
1
e, histories s
0
es
1
ps
1
e and s
0
es
1
ps
1
e can be merged and associated beliefs
added up. By repeating this process, we end up with a single history for each
current position of the evader s1e (let s
0
es
1
ps
1
e be such history), whose belief is
b′[s1p](s
0
es
1
ps
1
e) :=
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)∑
s˜1e 6∈s1p
∑
s˜0e 6∈s0p
b(s˜0e) · pie(s˜0e, s˜1e) =
bpie(s
1
e)∑
s˜1e 6∈s1p
bpie(s
1
e)
; b′[s1p](s
1
e) for short (6)
The updated belief b′[s1p] from Equation (6) complies with belief bpie (com-
puted according to Equation (3)) updated with the information that the evader
is located in none of the vertices of s1p. The belief in Ip[s
1
p] is identical with the
belief in top-level information set of the game Gt−1
〈
s1p, bpie
〉
; and hence the re-
sulting game is identical to the game Gt−1
〈
s1p, bpie
〉
up to the multiplication by γ.
The value of the game G[s1p] (Equation (5)), from which this game was derived,
is thus γvt−1
〈
s1p
〉
(bpie). We substitute this value to Equation (4) to obtain
u(∅) =
∑
s0e∈s0p
b(s0e) +
 ∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e)
 ·∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p) ·
(
γvt
〈
s1p
〉
(bpie)
)
(7)
By allowing the players to choose their optimal one-step strategies pip and pie in
Equation (7), we obtain the desired maximin formula shown in Equation (2). uunionsq
3.1 From value functions to optimal one-step strategies
The evaluation of the maximin formula from Equation (2) involves computation
of optimal strategies of the players. In this section we show that if the value
functions vt−1 are piecewise linear and convex functions represented by sets of
α-vectors (which holds due to Theorem 2), the strategies can be found out by
means of linear programming.
Due to the space constraints, we provide only the linear program for comput-
ing optimal one-step strategy of the pursuer in the game Gt
〈
s0p, b
〉
(its dual for
computing evader’s strategy can be found in the Appendix). At the beginning
of each round, the pursuer realizes what vertices the evader is not located in,
and hence updates his belief about the position of the evader. We can therefore
restrict ourselves to the case where b(se) = 0 for all se ∈ s0p.
In the following linear program, the pursuer seeks for a strategy maximizing
his expected utility against the best-responding opponent. He assumes strategies
of the form “move to s1p first and then follow strategy whose value is represented
by α ∈ vt−1〈s1p〉”. The choice of α uniquely defines such strategy. The proba-
bility of playing each strategy α ∈ vt−1〈s1p〉 is represented by variable pˆip(s1p, α).
Constraint (9) corresponds to the value of playing such randomized strategy
against the best-responding evader who starts in vertex se (α(s
′
e) denotes the
value of α evaluated at pure belief corresponding to action s′e of the evader).
The evader starts in se with probability b(se), hence the objective (8) calculates
the expectation over individual v(se). For the resulting one-step strategy of the
pursuer, it holds that pi(s1p) =
∑
α∈vt−1〈s1p〉 pˆi(s
1
p, α).
max
v,pˆip
γ
∑
se∈V
b(se) · v(se) (8)
s.t.
∑
s1p∈adj(s0p) ; α∈vt−1〈s1p〉
α(s′e) · pˆip(s1p, α) ≥ v(se) ∀se ∈ V ∀s′e ∈ adj(se) (9)
∑
s1p∈adj(s0p) ; α∈vt−1〈s1p〉
pˆip(s
′
p, α) = 1 (10)
pˆip(s
1
p, α) ≥ 0 ∀s1p ∈ adj(s0p) ∀α ∈ vt−1
〈
s1p
〉
(11)
3.2 Computing value functions
In each iteration of our value iteration algorithm, value functions vt are con-
structed from the solution from the previous iteration — value functions vt−1. By
repeating this construction, a sequence of finite-horizon value functions {vt}∞t=0
approaching the values of the infinite-horizon game is being constructed. The
value functions vt that are about to be constructed, as well as vt, are piecewise
linear and convex (Theorem 2). In this section, we show that this allows us to
avoid evaluating the dynamic programming operator H (Equation (2)) in every
point in the belief space and enables us to construct vt by considering only a
finite subset of beliefs, corresponding to the extreme points of line segments of
vt. We proceed in two steps: (1) firstly we compute a function Qtpip
〈
s0p
〉
corre-
sponding to the expected utility the pursuer gets if he plays pip at the first round
of the longer horizon game Gt
〈
s0p, b
〉
; (2) then we show how to compute vt
〈
s0p
〉
as a combination of multiple Qtpip
〈
s0p
〉
for properly chosen one-step strategies pip.
We start with a formal definition of function Qtpip
〈
s0p
〉
.
Definition 4. Let pip be pursuer’s one-step strategy for the first round of the
game Gt
〈
s0p, b
〉
. The value of pip is a function Q
t
pip
〈
s0p
〉
assigning the expected
reward the pursuer gets in the game Gt
〈
s0p, b
〉
against the best-responding oppo-
nent, when he plays pip in the first round and continues by playing according to
his optimal strategy in the rest of the game, i.e.
Qtpip
〈
s0p
〉
(b) :=
∑
se∈s0p
b(se) + γ
 ∑
se∈V\s0p
b(se)
 ·min
pie
∑
s1p∈VN
pip(s
1
p) · vt−1
〈
s1p
〉
(bpie) (12)
According to the previous definition, once the first round of the game is over,
the pursuer continues with his optimal strategy. The following lemma shows
that this optimal strategy for the rest of the game is well-defined and its value
is characterized by the value functions vt−1.
Lemma 4. Let pip be pursuer’s fixed one-step strategy for the first round of the
game. For every belief b there are strategies σp[s
1
p], one for each s
1
p ∈ adj(s0p),
represented by α-vectors α[s1p] ∈ vt−1
〈
s1p
〉
, such that it is optimal to follow σp[s
1
p]
when s1p was played in the first round of the game. The value of strategy σp
prescribing the pursuer to play according to pip in the first round and continue
by using respective σp[s
1
p] is linear and the corresponding α-vector satisfies
ασp(se) =
1 se ∈ spγ mins′e∈adj(se)∑s1p pip(s1p) · α[s1p](s′e) otherwise (13)
Lemma 4 gives us a direct algorithm for computing Qtpip . PWLC functions
vt−1 correspond to a finite number of horizon-t strategies, represented by a
finite number of α-vectors. Thus there is only a finite number of ways to choose
vˆt
〈
s0p
〉← {0|V|}
Πˆp = ∅
while ∃b ∈ ∆(V), pip 6∈ Πp : Qtpip
〈
s0p
〉
(b) > vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
(b) do
pip ← optimal strategy of the pursuer at belief b for the first round (see (8))
Πˆp ← Πˆp ∪ {pip}
vˆt
〈
s0p
〉← vˆt〈s0p〉⊕Qtpip〈sp〉
return vˆt〈sp〉
Algorithm 1: Incremental construction of value function vt〈sp〉
strategies σp[s
1
p] from Lemma 4, which can be found by means of enumeration.
The maximization over linear functions representing value of such strategies
corresponds to the function Qtpip〈sp〉 which is thus piecewise linear and convex.
The definition of Qtpip〈sp〉 implies that we can compute the value function
vt+1〈sp〉 by allowing the pursuer to play arbitrary strategy pip, when
vt
〈
s0p
〉
(b) = max
pip
Qtpip
〈
s0p
〉
(b) (14)
As a consequence of Theorem 1, it is sufficient to consider a finite set Πp of
strategies in the maximizer of Equation (14) and thus obtain vt
〈
s0p
〉
as the point-
wise maximum from respective Qtpip
〈
s0p
〉
functions, vt〈sp〉 =
⊕
pip∈Πp Q
t
pip〈sp〉.
The set of such strategies Πp is however initially unknown. We propose an algo-
rithm (Algorithm 1) that constructs both the set of strategies Πˆp and the value
function vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
incrementally by iteratively verifying whether the current set of
the strategies Πˆp is sufficient for obtaining the actual value function v
t
〈
s0p
〉
.
The Algorithm 1 is constructing a set of strategies Πˆp and a corresponding
estimate of value function vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
=
⊕
pip∈Πˆp Q
t
pip
〈
s0p
〉
, starting with an empty set
Πˆp. At each iteration, it verifies whether strategies Πˆp used to compute current
vˆt+1
〈
s0p
〉
are optimal in every belief b ∈ ∆(V). If it finds a belief b where the
strategy can be improved, i.e. there exists pip such that Q
t
pip
〈
s0p
〉
(b) > vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
(b),
it updates the set Πˆp and recomputes vˆ
t〈sp〉. If no such belief is found, all
required strategies were considered and vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
= vt
〈
s0p
〉
.
Whenever the value function vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
is not yet optimal in the whole belief
space, i.e. there exists a belief b where Qtpip
〈
s0p
〉
(b) > vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
(b), there exists a
belief b′ with the same property that forms an extreme point of a line segment
on vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
. This property is characterized by Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. If there is a belief b where vt
〈
s0p
〉
(b) > vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
(b), there must be a
belief b′ that forms an extreme point of a line segment on the surface of vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
where vt
〈
s0p
〉
(b′) > vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
(b′).
Thanks to Lemma 5, we can consider only a finite set of beliefs that form
extreme points of line segments on the value function vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
. In every iteration, a
one-step strategy that is optimal at some belief point (and thus must be present
in Πp) is added to the set Πˆp. As a consequence of the Theorem 1, the set Πp
that is necessary to obtain the optimal value function vt
〈
s0p
〉
is finite. Hence
after a finite number of iterations, the Algorithm 1 terminates.
3.3 Convergence and uniqueness of the solution
We demonstrate the convergence properties of our value iteration algorithm and
the uniqueness of the value functions solving the infinite horizon game by show-
ing that the dynamic programming operator H (Equation 2) is a contraction
mapping. The desired properties then follows from the Banach’s fixed point the-
orem [3]. We show the contractivity of H under the following max-norm:
‖v − v‖ = max
s0p∈VN
max
b∈∆(V)
|v 〈s0p〉 (b)− v 〈s0p〉 (b)| (15)
Lemma 6. The operator H is a contraction with contractivity factor γ < 1
under max-norm.
Theorem 4. There is a unique set of value functions v∗ satisfying v∗ = Hv∗
and the recursive application of H converges to v∗. Series {vt}∞i=0 thus converges
to value functions of an infinite horizon game.
Proof. The operator H is a contraction mapping defined on a metric space of
sets of bounded functions defined on the belief space. By applying Banach’s fixed
point theorem [3] we get that H has a unique fixed point v∗ and the recursive
application of H converges to v∗. uunionsq
Proposition 1. After t iterations of the value iteration algorithm, the value
function vt is γt-optimal (i.e. ‖vt − v∗‖ ≤ γt).
4 Conclusion
We present the first algorithm for solving the class of two-player discounted
pursuit-evasion games with infinite horizon and partial observability, where the
evader is assumed to be perfectly informed about the current state of the game
(i.e. position of pursuer’s units). This class of games has a significant relevance in
security domains where a robust strategy that provides guarantees in the worst
case is often desirable.
Our algorithm is a modification of the well-known value iteration algorithm
for solving Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs), or stochas-
tic games with concurrent moves. We show that the strategies can be compactly
represented using value functions that depend on the location of the pursuing
units and the belief about the position of the evader, but not explicitly on the
history of moves. These value functions are piecewise linear and convex and allow
us to design a dynamic programming operator for the value iteration algorithm.
Our work is the first step towards many practical algorithms for solving
discounted stochastic games with one-sided partial observability. These can be
applied in many scenarios requiring robust strategies and thus our work opens the
whole new area of research in algorithmic and computational game theory. One
natural continuation is an adaptation of point-based approximation algorithms
for POMDPs to improve the scalability of the value iteration algorithm.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The expected reward in the root node u(∅) is
u(∅) =
Evader is caught︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
s0e∈s0p
b(s0e) +
Evader is caught in the first round︷ ︸︸ ︷
γ
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
∑
s1p
∑
s1e∈s1p
b(s0e) · pip(s1p) · pie(s0e, s1e)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
All terminal histories for the first round, i.e. shorter than two actions
+
+
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
∑
s1p
∑
s1e 6∈s1p
b(s0e) · pip(s1p) · pie(s0e, s1e) · u(s0es1ps1e)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Evader is not caught in the first round
The derivation of Equation (4) is then just a technical derivation involving
operations with sums and normalization of conditional probability distributions.
Throughout the derivation we will use the equation of the transformed belief
(Equation (3)).
u(∅) =
∑
s0e∈s0p
b(s0e) + γ
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
∑
s1p
∑
s1e∈s1p
b(s0e) · pip(s1p) · pie(s0e, s1e) +
+
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
∑
s1p
∑
s1e 6∈s1p
b(s0e) · pip(s1p) · pie(s0e, s1e) · u(s0es1ps1e)
=
∑
s0e∈s0p
b(s0e) + γ
∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p)
∑
s1e∈s1p
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e) +
+
∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p)
∑
s1e 6∈s1p
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e) · u(s0es1ps1e)
=
∑
s0e∈s0p
b(s0e) + γ
 ∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e)
∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p)
∑
s1e∈s1p
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e)
+
+
∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p) ·
 ∑
s˜1e 6∈s1p
∑
s˜0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)
 ∑
s1e 6∈s1p
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
 b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)∑
s˜1e 6∈s1p
∑
s˜0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e) · u(s
0
es
1
ps
1
e)

=
∑
s0e∈s0p
b(s0e) +
 ∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e)

γ
∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p)
∑
s1e∈s1p
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e)
+
+
∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p)
 ∑
s˜1e 6∈s1p
∑
s˜0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e)
 ∑
s1e 6∈s1p
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
 b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)∑
s˜1e 6∈s1p
∑
s˜0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e) · u(s
0
es
1
ps
1
e)


=
∑
s0e∈s0p
b(s0e) +
 ∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e)

γ
∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p)
∑
s1e∈s1p
bpie(s
1
e) +
+
∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p)
 ∑
s1e 6∈s1p
bpie(s
1
e)
 ∑
s1e 6∈s1p
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
 b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)∑
s˜1e 6∈s1p
∑
s˜0e 6∈s0p
b(s˜0e) · pie(s˜0e, s˜1e) · u(s
0
es
1
ps
1
e)


=
∑
s0e∈s0p
b(s0e) +
 ∑
s0e 6∈s0p
b(s0e)
 ·∑
s1p
pip(s
1
p)
γ
∑
s1e∈s1p
bpie(s
1
e) +
+
 ∑
s1e 6∈s1p
bpie(s
1
e)
 ∑
s1e 6∈s1p
∑
s0e 6∈s0p
 b(s0e) · pie(s0e, s1e)∑
s˜1e 6∈s1p
∑
s˜0e 6∈s0p
b(s˜0e) · pie(s˜0e, s˜1e) · u(s
0
es
1
ps
1
e)


A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Let H1 be histories in the subtree of n1, H2 be histories in the subtree
of n2 and ξ : H1 → H2 be a bijection from the definition of the game tree
isomorphism. Let σ be a Nash equilibrium strategy profile in the game G and
σ[n1], σ[n2] be the optimal behaviors in subtrees of n1 and n2 when the strategy
profile σ is followed.
First of all, we show that we can modify the behavior in the subtree of n2
to σ′[n2], where σ′[n2](n) = σ[n1](ξ(n)) without changing the expected utility
(and hence we can assume that the strategies in both subtrees are the same).
Note that strategy profile σ′[n2] is valid in the subtree of n2 due to the fact that
subtrees beneath n1 and n2 are isomorphic. Moreover this change does not affect
behavior in the rest of the game, as σ[n1] was consistent with this behavior.
Assume that the strategy profile σ′[n2] is not optimal in the subtree of n2.
Strategies σ[n1] and σ
′[n2] induce the same distribution over leaf nodes in sub-
trees of n1 and n2 (up to the bijection ξ) and these leaf nodes have the same
utility values. Hence if one of the players wanted to deviate from σ′[n2] in the
subtree of n2, he would have wanted to do the same in the case of σ[n1] used in
the subtree of n1. Thus the strategy σ
′[n2] must be an optimal behavior in the
subtree of n2.
Strategies σ[n1] and σ
′[n2] induce the same distribution over the leafs in the
respective subtrees (given that the node n1, resp. n2, was reached). We construct
a game G′ from G by modifying the probability of reaching nodes n1 and n2 (the
belief in information set I of G′ is denoted b′). The probability of reaching one
of the terminal histories u ∈ H1 and ξ(u) in G′ remains the same as in G as long
as b′[I](n1) + b′[I](n2) = b[I](n1) + b[I](n2). The modification of the belief thus
does not change the optimal behavior of the players, and thus does not change
the value of the game.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Assume that the pursuer played action s1p in the first round of the game (drawn
from pip). The game moves to a shorter horizon game G
t−1〈s1p, bpie〉 with the
belief updated according to Equation (3) (where pie is evader’s best response
to pip). The optimal strategy σp[s
1
p] of the pursuer in G
t−1〈s1p, bpie〉 is optimal
at belief bpie , hence, by definition, its corresponding α-vector α[s
1
p] is present
in the value function vt−1
〈
s1p
〉
which expresses the value of all non-dominated
strategies in the game Gt−1
〈
s1p, bpie
〉
.
The value of every strategy is linear in belief (Lemma 1). It is therefore
sufficient to define the value of the strategy σp in each of the pure beliefs to form
the α-vector ασp . If the evader is located in the same vertex as one of the units
of the pursuer, the game ends immediately and the pursuer gets utility γ0 = 1.
If the evader is not immediately caught, she chooses a vertex s′e adjacent to
her current position se so that the expected utility of the pursuer is minimized.
We know that if the pursuer plays s1p in the first round and follows with σp[s
1
p]
afterwards, the expected utility of the pursuer is represented by the α-vector
αp[s
1
p] evaluated at the pure belief corresponding to the new position of the
evader s′e, multiplied by γ as one round has already passed.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 5
We show that if there is a belief point b, where the value function vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
can be
improved, the value function vt
〈
s0p
〉
can also be improved in at least one of the
vertices of the facet on the surface of vt
〈
s0p
〉
. We prove this by contradiction. Let
F be the facet on the surface of vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
that the belief b is projected on (i.e. b is a
convex combination of coordinates of vertices of F ). Assume that the value func-
tion vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
can be improved in b, but not in any of the vertices of F . This means
that for every belief b′ corresponding to the extreme point of the facet F , the
value function vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
is optimal, i.e. vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
(b′) = vt
〈
s0p
〉
(b′). Moreover, as the
value function can be improved at belief b, it holds that vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
(b) < vt
〈
s0p
〉
(b).
This means that the value of vt
〈
s0p
〉
at b is above facet F , as the original value
vˆt
〈
s0p
〉
(b) was a convex combination of its vertices, which contradicts the con-
vexity of the value function (Theorem 2).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 6
Let us define Qvpip〈sp〉 similarly to Qtpip〈sp〉 used in Section 3.2, with the exception
that we refer to an arbitrary value functions v instead of vt−1:
Qvpip〈sp〉 (b) :=
∑
se∈sp
b(se) + γ
 ∑
se∈V\sp
b(se)
 ·min
pie
∑
s′p∈VN
pip(s
′
p) · v
〈
s′p
〉
(bpie) (16)
The proof will closely follow the structure of the proof of Theorem 1 in [11].
First of all we show that for every sp ∈ VN and every valid pursuer’s one-step
strategy pip, the mapping v 7→ Qvpip〈sp〉 has a contractivity factor γ, then by
inspecting all possible sp and pip we show that the same holds for H. Note that
the difference |Qvpip〈sp〉 (b)−Qvpip〈sp〉 (b)| is maximized if b is chosen so that the
evader is not initially caught according to b (i.e.
∑
se∈sp b(se) = 0), which allows
us to simplify the derivation.∥∥∥Qvpip〈sp〉 −Qvpip〈sp〉∥∥∥ = max
b
∣∣∣Qvpip〈sp〉 (b)−Qvpip〈sp〉 (b)∣∣∣
= max
b
∣∣∣∣γminpie ∑s′p pip(s′p) · v 〈s′p〉 (bpie)− γminpi′e ∑s′p pip(s′p) · v 〈s′p〉 (bpi′e)
∣∣∣∣
= γmax
b
∣∣∣∣minpie ∑s′p pip(s′p) · v 〈s′p〉 (bpie)−minpi′e ∑s′p pip(s′p) · v 〈s′p〉 (bpi′e)
∣∣∣∣
≤ γmax
b
max
pie
∣∣∣∑s′p pip(s′p) · v 〈s′p〉 (bpie)−∑s′p pip(s′p) · v 〈s′p〉 (bpie)∣∣∣
≤ γmax
b′
∣∣∣∑s′p pip(s′p) · [v 〈s′p〉 (b′)− v 〈s′p〉 (b′)]∣∣∣
≤ γmax
b′
∑
s′p
pip(s
′
p) ·
∣∣v 〈s′p〉 (b′)− v 〈s′p〉 (b′)∣∣
≤ γmax
b′
∑
s′p
pip(s
′
p) · ‖v − v‖
≤ γ‖v − v‖
Let us now choose arbitrary sp ∈ VN and b ∈ ∆(V). Without loss of gen-
erality, let us assume that (Hv) 〈sp〉 (b) ≥ (Hv) 〈sp〉 (b). Let pi∗p be an optimal
one-shot strategy in b w.r.t. v (i.e. maximizing Qvpi∗p 〈sp〉 (b)) and pip an opti-
mal strategy w.r.t. v. Note that (Hv) 〈sp〉 (b) = Qvpi∗p 〈sp〉 (b) and (Hv) 〈sp〉 (b) =
Qvpip 〈sp〉 (b). It holds that Qvpi∗p 〈sp〉 (b) ≤ Qvpip 〈sp〉 (b) ≤ Qvpi∗p 〈sp〉 (b). Then:
|(Hv) 〈sp〉 (b)− (Hv) 〈sp〉 (b)| =
∣∣∣Qvpi∗p 〈sp〉 (b)−Qvpip 〈sp〉 (b)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Qvpi∗p 〈sp〉 (b)−Qvpi∗p 〈sp〉 (b)∣∣∣
≤ max
pip
∣∣∣Qvpip 〈sp〉 (b)−Qvpip 〈sp〉 (b)∣∣∣
≤ γ · ‖v − v‖
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1
The minimum reward the pursuer can get is zero, hence v0
〈
s0p
〉
(b) ≥ 0 for every
initial position of the pursuer s0p and every his belief b about the position of the
evader. Similarly the maximum reward is one, hence v∗
〈
s0p
〉
(b) ≤ 1 for every
s0p and every b. It holds therefore that ‖v0 − v∗‖ ≤ 1. Due to the contractivity
factor γ of the dynamic operator H, after t iterations the distance ‖vt − v∗‖ ≤
γt‖v0 − v∗‖ ≤ γt which completes the proof.
B Computing optimal strategies
B.1 Computing evader’s strategy
The idea behind the linear program for computing optimal evader’s one-step
strategy in game Gt
〈
s0p, b
〉
is similar to the one for solving the game from the
perspective of the pursuer (Section 3.1). In this case the roles of the players are
reversed — the evader seeks for her strategy, while the pursuer best-responds it.
Similarly as in Section 3.1, we focus on the case where b(s0e) = 0 for all s
0
e ∈ s0p.
By choosing the strategy pie, the evader decides the belief bpie in the shorter
horizon game Gt−1
〈
s1p, bpie
〉
(see Equation (3)). The calculation of this updated
belief is done by means of the Constraint (19). If the pursuer decides to move
to the set of vertices s1p, his expected utility is described by the value function
vt−1
〈
s1p
〉
multiplied by γ to account for the first round of the game. The pur-
suer best-responds by choosing the best s1p from his perspective, i.e. the one that
maximizes his utility, which is characterized by a set of best-response constraints
(Equation (18)). Note that the maximization over α-vectors in the value func-
tions is rewritten using a set of inequality constraints, one for each α-vector.
The evader then seeks for a strategy that minimizes the expected utility of the
pursuer (Equation (17)).
min
V,pie,bpie
V (17)
s.t. γ
∑
s′e∈V
α(s′e) · bpie(s′e) ≤ V ∀s1p ∈ (s0p) ∀α ∈ vt−1
〈
s1p
〉
(18)
∑
se∈V\s0p
b(se) · pie(se, s′e) = bpie(s′e) ∀s′e ∈ V (19)
∑
s′e∈adj(se)
pie(se, s
′
e) = 1 ∀se ∈ V (20)
pie(se, s
′
e) ≥ 0 ∀se ∈ V ∀s′e ∈ adj(se) (21)
